Source:
Wikipedia
Empathy is the capacity to recognize or understand
another's state of mind or
emotion. It is often characterized as the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes", or to in some way experience the outlook or emotions of another being within oneself. Empathy does not necessarily imply compassion, because this capacity can be present in context of compassionate or cruel behavior.
Etymology
The English word is derived from the Greek ἐμπάθεια (empatheia), "physical affection, passion, partiality" which comes from ἐν (en), "in, at" + πάθος (pathos), "feeling". The term was adapted by Theodore Lipps to create the German word Einfühlung ("feeling into") from which the English term is then more directly derived.
Since empathy involves understanding the
emotions of other people, the way it is characterized is derivative of the way emotions themselves are characterized. If for example, emotions are taken to be centrally characterized by bodily feelings, then grasping the bodily feelings of another will be central to empathy. On the other hand, if emotions are more centrally characterized by combinations of beliefs and desires, then grasping these beliefs and desires will be more essential to empathy. Furthermore, a distinction should be made between deliberately imagining
being another person, or being in their situation, and simply recognizing their emotion. The ability to imagine oneself as another person is a sophisticated imaginative process. However the basic capacity to recognize emotions is probably
innate and may be achieved unconsciously. Yet it can be trained, and achieved with various degrees of intensity or accuracy.
The human capacity to recognize the bodily feelings of another is related to one's imitative capacities, and seems to be grounded in the innate capacity to associate the bodily movements and facial expressions one sees in another with the proprioceptive feelings of producing those corresponding movements or expressions oneself. Humans also seem to make the same immediate connection between the tone of voice and other vocal expressions and inner feeling. See neurological basis below.
There is some debate concerning how exactly the conscious experience (or phenomenology) of empathy should be characterized. The basic idea is that by looking at the facial expressions or bodily movements of another, or by hearing their tone of voice, one may get an immediate sense of how they feel (as opposed to more intellectually noting the behavioral symptoms of their emotion).Though empathic recognition is likely to involve some form of arousal in the empathiser, they may not experience this feeling as belonging to their own body, but instead likely to perceptually locate the feeling 'in' the body of the other person. Alternatively the empathiser may instead get a sense of an emotional 'atmosphere' or that the emotion belongs equally to all the parties involved.
More fully developed empathy requires more than simply recognizing another's emotional state. Since emotions are typically directed towards objects or states of affairs, the empathiser may first require some idea of what that object might be (where object can include imaginary objects, concepts, other people, or even the empathiser). Alternatively the recognition of the feeling may precede the recognition of the object of that emotion, or even aid the empathiser in discovering the object of the other's emotion. The empathiser may also need to determine how the emotional state affects the way in which the other perceives the object. For example, the empathizer needs to determine which aspects of the object to focus on. Hence it is often not enough that the empathiser recognize the object toward which the other is directed, plus the bodily feeling, and then simply add these components together. Rather the empathiser needs to find the way into the loop where perception of the object affects feeling and feeling affects the perception of the object.
A person might sense that a friend is feeling annoyed via facial, vocal or postural expression. A person might sense that the friend is annoyed due to not getting what he wants, (general object of emotion); because he missed his train, (particular object of emotion); because he missed his train, but only by a few seconds, (focus of particular object); because he only just missed his train and he had an important meeting to get to, (background non-psychological context); or because he only just missed his train, and he had an important meeting and because he is generally an irritable sort of person (character traits).
Contrast with other phenomena
Empathy is distinct from
sympathy,
pity,
emotional contagion, and
telepathy.
Sympathy is the feeling of
compassion for another, the wish to see them better off or happier.
Pity is feeling that another is in trouble and in need of help as they cannot fix their problems themselves, often described as "feeling sorry" for someone.
Emotional contagion is when a person (especially an infant or a member of a
mob) imitatively 'catches' the emotions that others are showing without necessarily recognizing this is happening (Hatfield et al 1994).
Telepathy is not a psychological phenomenon, but a supposedly
paranormal phenomenon, whereby emotions or other mental states can be read directly, without needing to infer, or perceive expressive clues about the other person.
Pity is, "Things are bad for you, you seem as though you need help."
Sympathy is, "I'm sorry for your sadness, I wish to help."
Emotional Contagion is, "You feel sad and now I feel sad."
Empathy is, "I recognize how you feel."
Apathy is, "I don't care how you feel. "
Telepathy is, "I read your sadness without you expressing it to me in any normal way."
Schadenfreude is “Things are bad for you and I feel good about that.”
Lack of empathy
Some psychologists, psychiatrists, and other scientists believe that not all humans have an ability to feel empathy or perceive the emotions of others. For instance, Autism and related conditions such as Asperger's syndrome are often (but not always) characterized by an apparent reduced ability to empathize with others. The interaction between empathy and autism spectrum disorders is a complex and ongoing field of research. According to recent fMRI studies the syndrome of alexithymia, a condition in which an individual is rendered incapable of recognising and articulating emotional arousal in self or others, is responsible for a severe lack of emotional empathy. The lack of empathetic attunement inherent to alexithymic states may reduce quality and satisfaction of relationships.
According to Simon Baron-Cohen's ideas, an absence of empathy might also be related to an absence of theory of mind (i.e., the ability to model another's world view using either a theory-like analogy between oneself and others, or the ability to simulate pretend mental states and then apply the consequences of these simulations to others). Again with regard to autism, not all autistics fit this pattern, and the theory remains controversial, and does not differentiate between cognitive empathy and affective empathy, nor do autistic people lack compassion. Francesca Happe showed that autistic children who demonstrate a lack of theory of mind (cognitive empathy) lack theory of mind for self as well as for others.
In contrast, psychopaths are seemingly able to demonstrate the appearance of sensing the emotions of others with such a theory of mind, often demonstrating care and friendship in a convincing manner, and can use this ability to charm or manipulate, but they crucially lack the sympathy or compassion that empathy often leads to. However, it has been claimed that components of circuitry involved in empathy may also be dysfunctional in psychopathy (Tunstall N., Fahy T. and McGuire P. in: Guide to Neuroimaging in Psychiatry, Eds. Fu C et al, Martin Dunitz: London 2003). Empathy certainly does not guarantee benevolence. The same ability may underlie schadenfreude (taking pleasure in the pain of another entity) and sadism (being sexually gratified through the infliction of pain or humiliation on another person).
In philosophy
In the 2007 book "The Ethics of Care and Empathy," philosopher Michael Slote introduces a theory of care-based ethics that is grounded in empathy. His claim is that moral motivation does, and should stem from a basis of empathic response. He claims that our natural reaction to situations of moral significance are explained by empathy. He explains that the limits and obligations of empathy and in turn morality are natural. These natural obligations include a greater empathic, and moral obligation to family and friends, along with an account of temporal and physical distance. In situations of close temporal and physical distance, and with family or friends, our moral obligation seems stronger to us than with strangers at a distance naturally. Slote explains that this is due to empathy and our natural empathic ties. He further adds that actions are wrong if and only if they reflect or exhibit a deficiency of fully developed empathic concern for others on the part of the agent.
In phenomenology, empathy is used to describe the experience in which one experiences what the Other experiences. It should not, however, be understood as some kind of magical or telepathic connection, but rather as the experience of experiencing something from the Other's viewpoint. In the most basic sense, this is the experience of the Other's body, and in this sense, it is an experience of "my body over there." In most other respects, however, the experience is modified so that what is experienced is experienced as being the Other's experience; in experiencing empathy, what is experienced is not "my" experience, even though I experience it. Empathy is also considered to be the condition of intersubjectivity, and, as such, the source of the constitution of objectivity.
